However there are variations between different countries

The Governments of the euro area would that the European Central Bank (ECB) looks more like the Federal Reserve (Fed) American, by adopting a dual objective of fighting inflation and growth support, not only of price stability. This is what emerged from the recent work of two economists of the ECB who have studied (1), between 2000 and end of 2007, 767 statements of the leaders of the European States on the Central Bank.

A strong asymmetry is found: 60 of these statements and call the ECB to have rates low and 5 only at higher rates, the rest of the communications of a neutral tone. The colour of the Government and its political orientation matter little. Of course, the right is a little less "pro-growth" left, but the differences are in total somewhat Dim.

However, there are variations between different countries. Thus, countries with inflation is greater than the average European are more likely than others to invite the ECB to have higher rates (see below). This is the case of the Spain, while the Germany, which has experienced inflation more subdued on the period, expressed a preference for rates lower.

The number of statements by Governments about the Central Bank has strongly increased in 2007, year marked by the beginning of the crisis. The purpose of these releases less focused on the appropriate level of interest rates and expanded the mandate of the Institute of broadcast, its independence and the level of the euro, a subject still very sensitive in a period of soft growth such as today.

Preference for low rates

Thus, States would like that the ECB has guiding lower rates to encourage growth, and, even in the phases where these rates are already low significant in absolute terms (2004-2005). Researchers have calculated that the "ideal Director rate" for the Governments is on average lower by 40 basis (0.4) points the effective rate of the ECB. This preference for low rates is particularly favoured by a country that its own economy has low growth and that he hoped therefore that the Central Bank gives boost. Same observation when the country faces a debt and public deficit high, as is the case today in Europe, "which is consistent with the hypothesis that, in a union Monetary Union, the members displayed a preference for inflation, because the consequences of their action will be supported by all the members."

The criticism of the ECB comes more naturally to the Governments of countries where the issuing Institute confidence is low. They then follow suit to their public opinion to call for another policy, sometimes for electoral designs. Indeed, it is to avoid that its members be subjected to the pressure from their Governments that, unlike other Central as banks reserve US Federal, the ECB had not seen fit to publish the minutes of its meetings and votes. Its objective is to protect its voting members of the pressure that could exert on them their own countries to encourage them to vote for lower rates, because their economy is in an economic situation more difficult.

The Central Bank wants to avoid that the spirit supporter and Chapel suggests in his breast. It must not be the amalgam of national preferences of the different countries, inflation and growth. It then runs the risk of a policy inconsistent and little independent.